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Presentation draws on  
Asymmetric Engagement: The Community and 
Voluntary Pillar in Irish social partnership by Joe 
Larragy, Manchester University Press 2014 
• Collapse centralised wage agreements (1970-81) into 
decentralised bargaining 1981-87 
• Scenario in 1980s -  ongoing political instability, 
FG/Lab coalition 1982-87 
• Worsening situation in 1980s – ongoing fiscal crisis  
• Rising unemployment, poverty, emigration,  
– Lure of Thatcherism – PDs  
– Fear of Thatcherism – Trade unions  
• European possibilities  
• FDI potential impact 
Social Partnership in Ireland: context 
and origins 
Social Partnership in Ireland: context 
and origins 
• Political response to perceived threats 
• Irresolute demos: 
• 1987 election FF (Haughey) minority gov.  
• FG Tallaght strategy 
• NESC (1986), A Strategy for Development, 
provided underpinnings for a new type of social 
pact: Programme for National Recovery (PNR) 
1987-90 
New Social Pacts in Ireland 1987-2009 
• Tripartism: State-employers-unions (plus farmers) 
• new social pacts were to be competitive, supply-side, state-
directed, aimed at reducing national deficits and debt, 
eventually stimulating growth and jobs. 
• Unlike societal corporatism of post war decades based on 
full employment, with a social wage and welfare state 
expansion,  
• The union focus was on take-home pay – restraining wage 
demands  for (later) reduced taxes, as growth, revenue and 
employment improved. The “social wage” effect was very 
limited, and a low priority, as spending cuts were inflicted in 
health, housing and other areas 
• The landscape of unemployment, poverty, marginalisation 
and other social challenges 
Community organisations emerged in 
the 1980s 
• Apart from the trade unions, several NGOs emerged in the 
1980s, including the CWC, CORI Justice, the INOU, NWCI 
and others 
• They represented the unemployed, spoke out on poverty, 
marginalisation of local areas, and gender equality 
• They developed their analysis and critique, lobbied and 
protested, often linking up with Combat Poverty in putting 
forward new approaches to local community development 
and income maintenance 
• They looked to European Social Fund, European policies 
and new thinking and became knowledge holders on social 
inclusion. 
1990 Local development partnership  
• 1990-92: Progamme for Economic and Social Progress 
announced proposal for 12 local development partnership 
bodies to tackle social marginalisation through new means 
• National oversight and funding through Area 
Development Management (ADM - later Pobail) 
• Context included European support for local development 
& government credibiility on poverty and unemployment 
front] 
• 1993-6: Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW) 
extended local partnership idea to over 30 areas and 
much of country 
• Distinct from and only loosely connected to Social 
Partnership but a stepping stone for community sector 
 
1993 National Economic and Social 
Forum 
• 1993: National Economic and Social Forum 
established,  
• included politicians, unions, employers and, 
critically,  
• a “third strand” representing women, 
unemployed, ‘poverty’ sectors – e.g., INOU, CORI 
Justice, CWC, NWCI, and several others 
• The Third Strand used NESF for policy 
entrepreneurship in the areas of poverty, 
unemployment, social welfare & inequality 
 
1996 Community & Voluntary Pillar  
in Social Partnership 
• 1996: new Community and Voluntary Pillar (CVP) 
Provided structure for regulated entry of community 
and voluntary sectors to participate in social 
partnership talks and NESC 
• CVP focused on social inclusion, social welfare, 
unemployment, equality issues 
• This translated into Partnership 2000 – A programme 
for inclusion, employment and competitiveness 1997-
99 
• CVP won significant concesisons in this programme 
for the first time. 
 
What was the significance of 
innovative features? 
• In conventional neo-corporatism , actors other than 
elected government get involved in and make 
commitments towards policy making...  
• ...and government plays a part in the settlement of 
wage bargaining between labour  market actors.  
• The primary modality is bargaining or political 
exchange.  
• But the new partners were different. There were fears 
and suspicions from within the tripartite structure but 
the Department of the Taoiseach was supportive. 
Critics of the Pillar  
– left right and centre 
• Left : are the Community sector being 
incorporated and confined to purely moral 
critique with no power? 
• Right : could bring social partnership back to 
the 1970s scenario of bureaucracy & excessive 
demands on state, employers & fiscal pressure? 
• Centre : are community sector being allowed 
punch above their weight, without any 
accountability, undermining representative 
democracy?  
• Practical: would they muddy the waters by 
over-widening the agenda? 
 
New partners – new analysis 
• Apart from these critiques, which derived from 
sources that were often sceptical of social 
partnership anyway,  
• New interptetations of the significance of the 
Commnity Pillar came from people more 
sympathetic with a close interest in neo-
corporatism. 
• In particular, O’Donnell, Roche, Hardiman. 
Significance of CVP: Deliberation? 
• O’Donnell  (NESF 1997) put forward 
an innovative theory about a new 
type of social partnership with new 
type of social partner, with: 
– A shift from a bargaining modality to 
deliberation 
– New type of social partners and new 
ways of thinking for existing social 
partners 
– Transcending bargaining, forming a 
common strategic approach 
– Partners with more fluid positions and 
identities, not governed by rational 
actor theory,  
Flexible network governance 
• CVP not bargaining or 
in deliberative mode 
but part of a new 
modality of “network 
governance” 
...but the state is in the 




Significance of CVP:  
Extended bargaining / political 
exchange? 
• Roche: the CVP not  indicative of 
a new modality (deliberation)  
• CVP complements the unions by 
pursuing the social wage 
element, social inclusion  
• CVP junior partners in an 
extended political exchange, 




A wider theoretical compass 
• Limitations of corporatism as frame of 
reference for small organisations unlike unions 
and employer associations 
• Associations and civil society, more widely and 
historically 
• Social movements and policy 
entrepreneurship 
• Governance – representative and mediated 
• Power and legitimacy and the demos 
 
Community Pillar in Social Partnership 
• My study was to establish empirically what is going on 
with the CVP, as there was no detailed research on the 
Pillar. 
• It asked whether  
– the CVP relied on moral persuasion only and was doomed 
to fail and to be incorporated,  
– or whether politics always trumps partnership,  
– or was it able to bargain,  
– or was it part of a new higher level modality, of 
deliberation and problem-solving for the shared public 
good? 
• And it asked whether the CVP made any tangible gains. 
The mischief of faction 
• US tradition strong on keeping factions out of 
government but is flooded by lobbyists 
• Exclude or include factions? 
• Real Utopias – Joshua Cohen et al (1995) 
considered inclusive approach  
• …to include less powerful rather than try to 
keep out the powerful 
• Theoretically this looks something like what 
Ireland had with the (untheorised)CVP  
The case study 
• Using documentary and interview sources, I 
studied the origins, and course of existence of the 
CVP over 20 years, focusing on four key member 
organisations. 
• There are chapters on the CVP as a whole and on 
each of the following: 
– Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed (INOU) 
– Community Workers Co-operative (CWC) 
– Conference of Religious in Ireland Justice Commission 
(CORI Justice) 
– National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) 
Findings pointed to an account 
different from previous ones 
• Each organisation achieved some progress but also 
suffered setbacks. 
• C&V organisations can succeed but in limited ways, in 
limited circumstances and based on a different logic 
• The CVP organisations are unlike other  social partners 
(e.g. Unions) which engage in “symmetrical forms” of 
engagement – i.e., bargaining 
• Cannot afford to allow identity to be fluid. They need 
to be strong in principle and have strong analysis and 
clear medium and long term goals. 
 
Findings pointed to a different account 
– The CVP organisations could benefit from the 
shifts in public and electoral sentiment at key 
moments to win some concessions, e.g. 1996 and 
2004. 
– They could also be ejected from social partnership 
e.g., after rejecting the Sustaining Progress pact in 
2002. 
– Though small and lacking in bargaining power or 
resources, could gain from shift in the demos 




– A different  way of grasping the logic of the CVP 
– Stresses the difference between small organisations 
and “traditional social partners” using bargaining 
– crucially, vulnerability to government but have a tacit 
connection with the demos  
– capable of addressing important political questions of 
the common good, justice, equality 
– Not “rational actors” as in game theory but advocates 
for causes 




– The concept of Asymmetric engagement has parallels with 
warfare.  
– The term Asymmetric warfare is used to describe small, 
mobile guerrilla organisations engaging the more powerful 
standing army of a state. 
– Asymmetric engagement in social partnership – or perhaps 
in a wider set of civil contexts – involves small principled 
organisations engaging the more powerful groups of state, 
employers and unions. 
– Analogy with forms of warfare apt. Small forces can be 
dismissed or “wiped out” by the state in either case.  
– One key is whether the small organisations have tacit 




• Small organisations may be effective if they 
– operate as policy entrepreneurs with a determined 
focus on certain clear goals 
– have a long-term focus on achieving goals and 
objectives  
– Seek to benefit from shifts in the demos amid 
changing economic circumstances and political cycles  
The locus of legitimacy shifts and the balance of power 
shifts momentarily 





– due to fluctuations in the economy, fluctuations in the political cycle, 
and interactions between these 
– Windows of opportunity appear  
• E.g. 1989-90 on the draw-down of structural funds for local development, 
passed over by Dept. of Finance, triggered steps to area based partnership  
local development and link to Social Partnership for CWC 
• E.g. 1996-7 on the Commission on Social Welfare recommendations – a 
moment for INOU because of the timing ahead of a critical election 
• E.g. the “social turn” of Ahern  post 2004 local elections – a moment for CORI 
– see next slide 
• E.g. similarly, NWCI opposition to taxing of CB in 1996, and promotion of child 
care strategy and free child care during the “social turn” 
– Politics does trump partnership but sometimes the demos (electorate) 
trumps politicians 
– This creates periods of greater receptivity and potential for success  
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Figure 8.1 Single Short-term Social Welfare Rates as % of GAIE 
Lasting consequences, gains and losses 
• Social partnership is not really responsible for the financial 
collapse to any great degree 
• Some of the gains made by the CVP on social welfare 
protected welfare dependent population after 2008 
• The austerity that followed the global financial crisis 
resulted in the Troika bailout and an electoral landslide for 
FG./Labour in 2011 
• Post GFC politics has been “coercive” up to the present:  
– major cuts, new charges and taxes on labour, abandonment of 
institutions of social partnership, dismantling or consolidation of 
local development into local government 
• Run-up to general election opens the prospect of some 
concessions, even talk of wage co-ordination again 
Asymmetric engagement 
Asymmetric power can 
seem daunting 
Shifts in the demos 




political cycles and 
shifts in the demos… 
http://fromthetower.thig.com/your-window-of-opportunity/ 
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